"How defeat is suffered in war while winning battles? This is an important question. Whatever it is according to the yardstick of patriotism, when assessed from the angle of military science this is a question of theoretical as well as practical importance."
It was US infantry Colonel Harry G. Sommers who wrote the most debatable work from the point of view of military science on the strategic policy of the United States relating to the Vietnam War. The work “On strategy: A critical analysis of the Vietnam War” published in 1982 was written as a study for the American Military Academy by the then Lieutenant Colonel Sommers. But even today after two decades Sommers’ work is included in the list of recommended works of study or US marine regiment soldiers. A certain incident contained in it, which is considered as an analytical handbook capable of exerting a long term influence on American military thinking, became a well-known quote constantly quoted by latter day military analysts. It is part of a dialogue between Colonel Sommers and a Vietnam People’s Army Colonel when the South Vietnam capital Saigon falling into the hands of Communist guerrillas was imminent, decisively marking the infamous defeat of the United States.
Colonel Sommers: Remember, you never succeeded in defeating us on the battlefield.
North Vietnamese Colonel: Yes, it can even be so, but just as much it is not relevant.
What is the significance contained in this short piece of dialogue continued to be quoted even after thirty years of the Vietnam War? The importance is this: It opens a way to clarify reasons for the important strategic problem as to how the United States that was victorious in the majority of strategic battles in Vietnam became the vanquished in the overall Vietnam War. If the reply, the Communist Army Colonel gave to Colonel Sommers is elaborated on a little, it would be: “It is true that you won every battle you fought in Vietnam. But that fact is not at all relevant to your becoming the vanquished and our being the victor in the Vietnam War. The reply the Communist Army Officer gave to the American Colonel was actually a number of years earlier had been reminded to American Army Chiefs in picturesque language by Vietnamese Communist Party’s leader Ho Chi Min. What he said was: “For every one of yours killed by me you can kill ten of my fighters. But even within such a circumstance you will get defeated and I will emerge victorious”. The lesson Communist guerrillas taught in Vietnam as to how defeat is suffered in wars winning victories in battles is being reminded to the United States armies by Afghan and Iraqi guerrillas even after thirty years.
Losing the war while winning battles
How defeat is suffered in war while winning battles? This is an important question. Whatever it is according to the yardstick of patriotism, when assessed from the angle of military science this is a question of theoretical as well as practical importance. Colonel Sommers seriously grappled with this question through his work published twenty five years ago. The central issue he raised with regard to military strategy revolves round the contradiction as to why the considerable series of strategic victories the American regiments won in the Vietnam battlefield had a negative effect on the final strategic result of the war. Sommers replies to it by his work. It is because his replies are controversial that it was mentioned that his work was a controversial one at the beginning of this article.
There is a reason why it is so. Even by the time Sommers wrote his work the predominant stream of thought entrenched within the United States military process was fundamentally based on the theoretical teaching of the classical military science. Its conceptual framework is mainly fashioned by the basic military principles and teachings of modern western military science’s leading military thinkers Karl von Clauswitz and Antoine Jomini. Clauswitz as well as Jomini drew their principles basically from the content of the Napoleonic wars that raged based on nation states in Europe contemporary to them. These wars raged based on conventional military formations. Therefore they were considered as raging within asymmetrical forces. But the challenge the American forces faced in Vietnam was an unconventional one. Therefore it was asymmetrical. A main
reason why Colonel Sommers’ reply was controversial was the contradiction that lay between the non-conventional reality he experienced in Vietnam and is conventional analytical framework. However, when inquiring about the final strategic result of the Vietnam War a certain extremely important military concept is found within the classical western military scientific teachings utilised by Colonel Sommers. That is the concept of centre of gravity advanced by Clauswitz.
Centre of Gravity of War
It is worthwhile to inquire as to what the basic essence of Clauswitz’s military concept Centre of Gravity (Schwerpunkt). This can be substituted in a war. The whole system breaks down when this centre of gravity is attacked hard and decisively. In a conventional war the Centre of Gravity of the opposing side is determined by taking, the circumstances and conditions peculiar to each war into consideration. It can be the military build up of the opposing party. If not it can be the administrative and economic infrastructure. If not it can be the individual factors providing military or political leadership, population and urban areas.
For instance it was the British urban systems that Hitler thought to be the main centre of gravity of Britain, during the Second World War. He expected that Britain could be made to surrender by continuous and massive air raids targeting them. In the first Gulf War it was Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his republican guard, nuclear, chemical and biological military capabilities of Iraq that United States Central Command Operations Commander General Norman Swashkoft considered as the Centres of Gravity of the Iraq War. But his joint Air Force Commander General Charles Homer thought that 12 factors including the Iraqi national leadership, railways system, airport and harbours should be considered as Centres of Gravity. Finally what was targeted in the ‘Operation Desert Storm’ were a few of these selected at random.
These apply to wars between conventional forces. But it is entirely different in the case of wars between asymmetrical forces. This is especially so in guerrilla warfare. In a war of national liberation it lies in the collective political will with regard to national freedom against the invading force. In simple terms, in a guerrilla war it is the collective that is the Centre of Gravity. This cannot be destroyed by air raids. It cannot be rendered inactive by capturing cities and land. What is needed is a political approach.
Centre of Gravity of the Eelam war
At least thirty years have been taken by the Eelam war to date. That is in terms of an armed struggle. But it is a logical development of the peaceful unarmed political struggle of the Tamil people that existed prior to it. This logical nexus was not negated by the assassination of Amirthalingam by Prabhakaran. It cannot be vanquished by bullets. The collective political will cannot be destroyed by capturing Jaffna. The de-merger of the North and the East, the Muttur and the Sampur victories have actually intensified the fear of the Tamil people of the destruction of their collective national existence. It is this political will that is disclosed by the letter dated December 26th last year sent by V. Ananda Sangaree, who according to the majority of the Sinhala people in the South is anti-Tiger, to the President, with regard to the de-merger of the North and East. It is the same collective aspiration that the press communiqué issued on December 25th last signed by Karuna Ammans political ally Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front President G. Gnanasekaram. It is this same political aspiration that is endorsed by the document ‘Programme for a Practical Solution’ issued on January 01st 2007 by the Eelam People’s Democratic Party of Douglas Devananda whom the majority of the Sinhala people consider to be a genuine representation of the democratic political stream opposed to Prabhakaran.
It is by taking these realities into consideration that the strategic consequences of the strategic victories the government forces won from Sampur to Vakarai should be assessed. Merely reading through the concise report UTHR-Briefing No. 06 of the University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR) who are considered to hold anti-Tiger views or the article titled ‘The continuing agony of the Eastern Tamil civilians’ on the Tamilweek Website would suffice for such an assessment.
